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What exactly do commissioners in the NHS do? As the new NHS 
and Social Care Act 2012 puts so much weight on commissioners 
influencing the performance of providers of care, analysis of what 
commissioners do, and how they might be more effective, is very 
timely. The analysis in this report draws on in-depth research in three 
primary care trusts: Wirral, Calderdale and Somerset. The findings 
are used to identify what appears to help and hinder effective 
commissioning, and offer useful insights for clinical commissioning 
groups as they begin their work from April 2013.  
Key Points
•  This study explored what commissioners actually do to commission care 
for people with long-term conditions, and how this might be improved. 
The research was based on 15 months of detailed observation from 
November 2010 to January 2012 in three commissioning communities: 
Calderdale, Somerset and the Wirral. These sites were selected 
because on various indicators they appeared to be at the forefront of 
commissioning practice.
•  In all three primary care trust sites, commissioning NHS care for people 
with long-term conditions was observed to be a very labour-intensive 
activity, characterised far more by ‘relational’ work (for example 
developing collaborative relationships and consensus with stakeholders) 
than harder edge critical challenge of providers. Commissioners tended 
to adopt a convenor role in the local health economy, drawing together 
different organisations to plan, contract and review care provided. 
•  The labour of commissioning by primary care trusts was often  
focused on making small but marginal service changes, for which the 
effort involved did not always appear proportionate to improvements 
in services or outcomes secured. Activities did not fit a neat annual 
commissioning cycle, but were found to overlap one another, and 
extend over a much longer period. Providers were closely involved in 
commissioning, and sometimes led areas of work to review and  
design services. 
Find out more online at: www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/commissioning-high-quality-care
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•  In discussions about commissioning services for people with long-term 
conditions, financial matters seemed frequently peripheral, possibly 
because the services discussed were paid for using a block contract. This 
suggests that negotiations about finance took place elsewhere, possibly 
between finance directors of the primary care trust and the relevant 
provider, rather than commissioning or service managers.
•  The effectiveness of commissioners in bringing about new or reshaped 
services was inhibited by: lack of resources to invest in supporting 
change; significant turbulence, for example staff turnover and 
organisational restructuring resulting from reforms in the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012; lack of data (real and perceived); and ingrained 
caution about destabilising local providers.
•  Given constrained resources over the coming decade (Roberts and 
others, 2012), clinical commissioning groups will have to have a  
focused set of priorities and be able to justify them to local stakeholders 
such as HealthWatch and Health and Wellbeing Boards, including why 
they are concentrating on the redesign of certain services and not others 
within a particular time period. 
•  In the light of the Francis Inquiry Report, the quality of NHS-funded 
care provided to the population will come under greater scrutiny and 
commissioners will need to make judicious use of peer review and other 
data to support their decisions.
•  GP-led clinical commissioning groups will take over responsibility 
for funding, planning and procuring health services for their local 
communities. As part of this role they will have to justify the way in 
which they commission care for people with long-term conditions. 
Clear goals, monitoring and review, with effective challenge of providers 
(backed up with data) are axiomatic. But so will be exploration of 
new forms of contracting and risk-sharing to ensure that the effort of 
commissioning is worth the cost – a question we are still asking after 
two decades.
4 Commissioning high-quality care for people with long-term conditions
Background
Commissioning is the process of aligning resources with the health needs of a 
population, within a defined budget. The model of commissioning used in the NHS 
derives from the concept of New Public Management (Ferlie, 1996), which makes 
a distinction between providers and purchasers of public services, and emphasises 
the importance of specifying standards and using contracts to secure and monitor 
provision of care. 
One of the most influential analyses of health care commissioning is Øvretveit’s 
(1995) work, which identifies a ‘commissioning cycle’ within which needs assessment, 
planning, contracting and review are repeated annually, as set out in Figure 1. The 
emphasis in Øvretveit’s work on the broad functions of commissioning has been 
reflected in much of the research and policy analysis on the topic. Less emphasis has 
however been given to the detail of how commissioning is carried out in practice.
Commissioning can take place at a number of levels, ranging from personal health 
budgets held by individual service users, to the commissioning of highly specialised 
services at a national level (Smith and others, 2004). The focus of the research reported 
here is on commissioning of primary and secondary care services at a local level; this 
was led by primary care trusts, the organisations which were, from 2002 to 2013, 
the local statutory purchasing bodies for the majority of NHS care in England, often 
working with GPs acting as ‘practice-based commissioners’.
Since the late 1990s, commissioners in the English NHS – latterly primary care trusts 
– have worked to guidance from the Department of Health which promoted the 
Øvretveit cycle of commissioning. In April 2013, primary care trusts are being replaced 
by 211 new statutory GP-led clinical commissioning groups, which will take on 
similar commissioning responsibilities. Clinical commissioning groups will be charged 
with funding, planning and procuring health services to meet the needs of their local 
population. A new NHS Commissioning Board will oversee and support the new 
system, and will also directly commission primary care and specialised health services.
Source: Adapted from Department of Health (2003), adapted from Øvretveit (1995)
Revise
Monitor
Assess 
needs Plan
Contract
 Figure 1: The commissioning cycle
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The research
The aim of this research was to explore what NHS commissioners actually do to 
commission care for people with long-term conditions, and how this process might be 
improved. The objectives were to:
• identify the organisation and processes associated with effective commissioning
• identify an appropriate set of outcomes for effective commissioning
• draw on experience from other sectors and international health systems
•  consider how the learning from this research could be more widely  
applicable in the NHS.
The research was a comparative case study project, with three in-depth case studies 
of ‘commissioning communities’: Somerset, the Wirral and Calderdale (subsequently 
expanded to include Kirklees; details in Table 1). Each case study was based on a 
primary care trust, but included other organisations involved in planning, funding or 
delivering care.
Each case study was based on a primary care trust, 
but included other organisations involved in planning, 
funding or delivering care
The three sites were drawn from a cohort of primary care trusts identified as ‘high 
performing commissioners’ using a set of quantitative metrics related to the processes 
and outcomes of commissioning (for full details, see Smith and others, 2013). The aim 
was to identify a broad list of potential study sites where ‘performance’ appeared better 
than would have been expected when compared to similar organisations. The cohort 
was verified by a panel of experts, and invitations to participate were sent out to the 
primary care trusts’ chief executives. The first three to respond positively were selected.
An initial orientation phase was followed by an in-depth examination of 
commissioning practice from November 2010 to January 2012. Qualitative data were 
collected through interviews (92), observations of meetings (27) and documents (345). 
Quantitative data were collected on activity levels, costs and patient experience.
Within each site, the research focused on the commissioning of care for people with 
long-term conditions: diabetes in all three sites (to allow comparison), and a second 
condition chosen by each primary care trust: dementia in Calderdale and the Wirral, 
and stroke in Somerset. 
In Calderdale, the primary care trust did not have a provider arm, and community 
health services were provided by the local acute trust. In Somerset, community health 
services (including community hospitals) transferred from the primary care trust 
provider arm to the local mental health trust in 2011. In the Wirral, the primary care 
trust did not have a provider arm, and community health services were delivered by a 
local NHS community trust.  
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For each of the service areas studied, primary care trusts identified a specific 
commissioning development in progress, which could be tracked in detail by the 
research team. A summary of the six commissioning developments is given in Table 2.
Site Commissioning development tracked Stage of 
development
Providers
Calderdale A strategic plan for diabetes services
Review of provision of diabetes care and discussion of strategic 
remodelling of the service.
Discussion  
and planning 
GPs
Community health
Acute trust
Calderdale  A strategic review of dementia care
A ‘transformational review’ across two primary care trust areas 
(Calderdale and Kirklees), including NHS services, social care 
and third-sector provision. Emphasis on early intervention and 
supporting independence.
Discussion  
and planning 
Mental health trust
GPs
Two acute trusts
Third-sector providers
Somerset Somerset diabetes service
Remodelling diabetes care into a three-tier service: intermediate 
care delivered by nurses in community clinics, enabling step-up 
to consultant care and handover to GP care as appropriate. 
Commenced 
operation
Four acute trusts
Community health 
GPs
Third sector-providers
Somerset Early supported discharge service for stroke 
Establishment of a service delivering intensive therapy at home 
to patients recovering from a stroke.
Commenced 
operation
Four acute trusts
Community health 
Wirral Diabetic podiatry service 
Review of diabetic podiatry service to resolve longstanding 
operational problems, including records management and 
referral across organisations.
Discussion,  
planning, 
modelling
GPs
Community health
Acute trust
Wirral Memory assessment service
Establishment of a new community-based service for diagnosis 
and treatment of dementia. New service located in community 
clinics led by nurses and supported by psychiatrists. 
Commenced 
operation
Mental health trust
Third-sector provider
 Table 2: The six commissioning developments selected for detailed study
Calderdale Somerset Wirral
Population (2010 mid-year 
estimate, Office for National 
Statistics)
202,741 525,186 308,837
Level of deprivationi  Higher than  
England average
Lower than  
England average
Higher than  
England average
Overall spend per weighted 
head of populationii 
£1,651 £1,643    £1,685
Long-term conditions  
included in the study
Diabetes
Dementia
Diabetes
Stroke
Diabetes
Dementia
 Table 1: Characteristics of participating study sites
i  Association of Public Health Observatories/Department of Health (2011)
ii  Association of Public Health Observatories/Department of Health (2010)
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Findings
Based on our detailed tracking of the commissioning developments set out in Table 2,  
we identified the following seven themes, which characterise the practice of 
commissioning care for people with long-term conditions as observed in this study: 
1. The scope of commissioning
2. The labour of commissioning
3. Identifying the commissioners
4. The question of money
5. The scale and pace of change
6. Directives and guidance for commissioning
7. Working in a context of uncertainty.
We examine these themes here, then consider the implications of this analysis for the 
new clinical commissioning groups.
1.	The	scope	of	commissioning
Our research challenged the notion of a neat annual ‘commissioning cycle’ as suggested 
by Øvretveit. Instead, we observed a more complex set of overlapping activities, 
typically running in parallel rather than sequentially, and taking place over a longer 
period of time – many years in some cases. Activities that are not usually included 
within the commissioning cycle model were also observed, including the convening 
of local organisations in order to plan services, and supporting the implementation of 
service change. 
The majority of commissioners we talked to were aware of the model and talked about 
it as a useful device, but reported that commissioning tasks did not often run in the 
suggested sequence. For example, the Early Supported Discharge Service for Stroke in 
Somerset had already been running for some months (covered by existing contractual 
arrangements) before the transactional aspects of the arrangement were formally 
agreed between commissioner and provider. Monitoring of activity levels, and lengthy 
discussions between commissioners and providers during the implementation phase, 
informed the preparation of a service specification and performance management 
framework once the service was already operating. 
The review stage of the commissioning cycle seemed to present particular challenges 
to commissioners, who seemed reluctant to set out hard plans and timetables for 
evaluating whether a service model was worth continuing with. 
Our focus on particular developments highlighted the difference between these 
examples of active recommissioning, and those service areas which were being left to 
‘tick over’, with the same model of care continuing under annually renewed contracts. 
For each development, there was a tangible starting point such as a demand mapping 
exercise or an external quality assessment. This led to an additional commissioning 
task, not identified in the commissioning cycle – of drawing a boundary around a 
particular ‘parcel’ of health care to make it a manageable unit for commissioning.  
This often proved to be a complex task, reflecting the fact that care for people with 
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long-term conditions can straddle multiple providers. Commissioning seemed to work 
most effectively where commissioners were able to negotiate ‘bite-sized’ service changes 
and fit these into a bigger strategic vision of change.  
Commissioning seemed to work most effectively where 
commissioners were able to fit ‘bite-sized’ tasks into a 
bigger strategic vision  
2.	The	labour	of	commissioning
A huge amount of effort was observed going into commissioning across all six  
service developments, in terms of strategic planning, service review, and hands-on  
work (typically by middle managers within primary care trusts) to implement and 
support change. 
Commissioning work included both technical tasks (for example data collection, 
modelling of future service needs, review of evidence, contract negotiation and analysis 
of patient experience data) and relational activity with stakeholders (for example service 
review workshops, planning meetings, consultation with user groups, encouraging best 
practice and relevant organisational change, and project management support). We 
observed a large amount of labour going into these relational tasks, with commissioners 
primarily the convenors and coordinators of NHS planning and development work in 
the local area.
In the case of three of the service developments, a lack of capacity within the primary 
care trust for undertaking both the technical and relational labour of commissioning 
appeared to be a factor inhibiting progress. In contrast, most progress had been made 
in bringing about new services where there was a key commissioning manager, as one 
interviewee observed:
   ‘Just having that key person that’s able to coordinate efforts across everybody and  
actually just keep on, keep saying...“Right, have we done what we said we were 
going to do?”... Just keeping that persistence.’
The scale and intensity of the commissioning work observed in this study raised 
questions about whether it was proportionate to the impact on service delivery, quality 
and patient care.
3.	Identifying	the	commissioners
As noted earlier, the theory of public service contracting identifies commissioners as 
the people planning and funding services to meet local health care needs, distinct from 
those who provide services (Ferlie, 1996). In this research, we observed that the tasks 
of commissioning were not carried out exclusively by people working for primary care 
trusts with ‘commissioner’ in their job description. Managers and professional staff 
from NHS provider organisations, along with local authority staff, GPs and other 
clinicians also played a role, as did, to a lesser extent, patient representatives and third-
sector organisations. 
The contribution of different parties varied according to the stage in the commissioning 
process, with the widest range of contributors at the needs assessment and review 
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stages, and a much smaller group taking part in the more formal transactional tasks of 
contract specification and procurement. 
One manager from a provider trust reflected on the extent to which they and the 
commissioners seemed to be working together towards common goals:
   ‘It does feel like the conversations are very much about partners helping each other 
to work with situations rather than adversaries trying to screw every little last 
advantage out of each other.’
In three of the commissioning developments studied, the provider organisations 
were particularly prominent in the process. Providers brought specialist knowledge of 
clinical care and national developments, along with ideas about new models of care. 
In some cases they offered specific skills in project management, strategic planning, 
coordination and leadership. For example, the clinical team at the local mental 
health trust was instrumental in the development of the Wirral Memory Assessment 
Service. Similarly, in Calderdale, staff from the mental health trust convened a series 
of planning workshops to carry out a strategic review of the broad picture of dementia 
care locally. 
4.	The	question	of	money
A core objective of NHS commissioning is to achieve value for money in the 
delivery of services, paying careful attention to both the quality and cost of services 
commissioned (Department of Health, 2007). It was therefore surprising that we 
observed money as being an intermittent, and at times apparently peripheral, focus of 
attention in the day-to-day practice of commissioning. Although commissioners were 
mindful of the need to get value for money and often referred to the national Quality, 
Innovation, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) programme, information on costs did 
not appear to form a core part of the daily business of commissioning. 
In relation to all six developments, commissioners assumed that savings would accrue 
in the long-term (over five to ten years) through, for example, reduced hospital 
admissions, and use of outreach and telehealth to support home care. The emphasis 
was on containing costs and increasing quality of care in the face of rising demand, 
particularly for dementia and diabetes. 
A significant proportion of the spending on care for all six service areas was through 
multi-million pound block contracts held with mental health and community health 
providers (see Table 20, p119 of Smith and others, 2013 for more detail), and this 
meant that commissioners sometimes found it difficult to extract information on 
costs relating to a particular element of service delivery. There was also less pressure to 
examine services and consider alternative approaches to provision. 
Our research revealed that the organisational structure of primary care trusts appeared 
to encourage a separation of financial and contractual aspects of commissioning 
from the more relational service development work. While it typically fell to middle 
managers to undertake the main labour of commissioning, financial deals for block 
contracts were negotiated by finance directors and their teams as part of the wider 
financial settlement between the primary care trust and its main providers. This 
highlights the apparently limited scope for commissioners to use finance as a key lever 
for influencing providers, as set out in the theory underlying the current model of 
NHS commissioning.
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5.	The	scale	and	pace	of	change
Commissioning has the potential to bring about fundamental changes to health care 
provision through discontinuing some services and procuring other new services. 
We observed an approach to change which was, however, much more incremental 
and cautious. The scale and pace of change were inhibited by lack of resources to 
support project management and staff transfers, lack of data (actual and perceived), 
the challenges of working across many organisations, and caution about disrupting the 
local health economy. The key facilitators enabling change through commissioning 
appeared to be a combination of dynamic and sustained leadership by senior managers 
and clinicians, planned and phased implementation, and commitment from local 
clinicians, managers and the public.
The scale and pace of change were inhibited by lack of 
resources to support project management 
Success seemed to come about where commissioners were tackling discrete, ‘bite-
sized’ commissioning tasks as part of a wider local plan for service delivery. The Wirral 
Memory Assessment Service, for example, was introduced alongside parallel strands of 
work (such as a reduction in the use of anti-psychotic medication in care homes, and 
the commissioning of Extra Care housing) that formed an overall strategy for dementia 
care in the local area. 
In some instances, the linking of strategic vision and local action was unclear. The 
reasons for this included: the strategic vision was still under debate (e.g. diabetes 
in Calderdale, dementia in Calderdale); commissioning was reactive, rather than 
proactively driving the service (e.g. diabetic podiatry in Wirral); or there was ambiguity 
about which geographical area the initiative was covering (e.g. dementia in Calderdale).
6.	Directives	and	guidance	for	commissioning
National directives and guidance played a powerful role in shaping local 
commissioning practice across all six service developments. These fell into three broad 
categories: ‘must do’ policy directives and national strategies from the Department of 
Health; ‘should do’ guidance on best practice from the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and other national bodies; and ‘could do’ support 
from a range of academic, professional and patient organisations, for example, the 
standards for diabetes care set out by the charity Diabetes UK. Some external drivers, 
such as the Quality and Outcomes Framework, were generic in scope, but most were 
specific to the particular long-term condition. 
The time required to identify, read, interpret and put into practice external drivers was 
extensive – another factor contributing to the ‘labour of commissioning’. Selectivity 
was clearly needed on the part of commissioners, along with an ability to balance the 
national and external with locally determined priorities. 
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7.	Working	in	a	context	of	uncertainty
This study took place at a time when significant changes were taking place to the 
organisation and structure of the NHS in England. Work was under way to establish 
new clinical commissioning groups, along with a network of commissioning support 
organisations. There were also changes to organisations carrying out public health, 
joint commissioning with local authorities, and public and patient involvement. One 
result was that established relationships between the primary care trust and a range of 
other local stakeholders were disrupted.
Senior managers in all three primary care trusts reported spending a significant 
proportion of their time on implementing the reforms. As one noted in 2011:
  ‘ My job has changed absolutely and entirely in the last six months. I focus more or 
less 100% of my time now on transitional issues.’ 
What was striking was that commissioners did manage to get on with the job, even 
in the face of major uncertainty, and when some managers were facing redundancy. 
Regular reorganisation over the past two decades (Smith and Curry, 2011) may have 
made NHS commissioners accustomed to handling uncertainty. 
Discussion
Broad	findings
The findings from our research paint a picture of NHS commissioning, at least for 
long-term conditions, that is far removed from the competitive and market-focused 
approach intended at the inception of the NHS internal market in 1990, and reiterated 
in the 2010 NHS White Paper. Where local commissioning practice was observed 
in this research as being effective – that is, leading to a new or reshaped service with 
specific objectives for improvement – a number of factors appeared to be in place:
•  a coherent plan for the development of the service, combining a clear strategic vision 
for improved care and value for money, with a series of ‘bite-size’ projects forming a 
plan for implementation
•  clarity of roles and responsibilities, with clinicians and other providers active in the 
planning and development elements of commissioning, yet ceding influence to the 
commissioners when it came to service procurement
•  effective and sustained managerial and clinical leadership within the commissioning 
organisation (particularly at second-line level), including an ability to translate 
external drivers into actionable and achievable local goals
•  commissioners able to link the relational and transactional aspects of their role, 
ensuring an appropriate degree of contestability alongside necessary collaboration.
This research underlined the difficulty of trying to measure the impact of health 
care commissioning, given the complex and overlapping activities that constitute 
commissioning, and the fact that other factors (such as the payment mechanism, the 
nature of contracts for the service and lack of outcome measures for the service) also 
have an influence. Given the focus in this research on the practice (as opposed to 
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outcomes) of commissioning, it made sense to use proxy measures to determine the 
degree of effectiveness of commissioning practice. Activities associated with effective 
commissioning practice, together with suggested measures, were developed as part of 
the research and are shown in Table 3. 
1 Acting as the convenor of multiple local interests and stakeholders
Measure: regular surveying of local providers and users about the performance of commissioners, especially in taking 
account of local advice and views
2 Ensuring a clear focus on priority setting for health spending, resisting the temptation to concentrate 
commissioning work on a few services at the margins
Measure: evidence of use of regional and national benchmarking data on finance and service performance, and making 
changes to commissioning priorities
3 Getting the right balance between relational and transactional commissioning, knowing when to move 
on from engagement and planning, to implementation
Measure: review of number of meetings involved in a programme of commissioning in relation to service changes made, 
with cost–benefit analysis of commissioning labour 
4 Keeping a focus on the monitoring of activity, financial performance and service quality, and using this 
to inform review of the overall commissioning portfolio 
Measure: production of regular public reports about activity, financial performance and quality of services 
commissioned, benchmarked against national standards, and information about how this is being used to inform future 
commissioning plans
5 Using an appropriate commissioning approach for the type of service in question  
(for example, emphasis on relational contracting and shared risk for long-term conditions,  
item-of-service purchasing of elective care)  
Measure: brief description of approaches used in commissioner’s annual report, linked to changes in outcomes for the 
specific services
6 Identifying and supporting key individuals who play a pivotal role in local commissioning, in particular 
middle managers who work closely with clinical commissioners
Measure: evidence of clearly identified lead managers for core commissioning areas, and of investment in training, 
development and support for these individuals, and information about their retention 
7 Ensuring that there is adequate clinical involvement in commissioning discussions and activity, with 
robust governance
Measure: regular survey of local clinicians about their involvement in commissioning and whether they think  
it is useful 
8 Ensuring that any newly commissioned (or recommissioned) services have a set of specific and 
measurable objectives  
Measure: documented objectives and measures for such services, including comparison with NICE benchmarks of 
clinical and cost-effectiveness 
9 Having a programme of review and recommissioning for those services which consume most resources, 
to ensure proportionate focus of commissioning effort
Measure: publication of an annual commissioning plan including reports of service review, actions taken as a result  
and plans for the forthcoming year 
 Table 3: Activities associated with ‘effective commissioning’, and suggested measures of effectiveness
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Implications for developing effective commissioning
Commissioning	effort	has	to	be	worth	the	outcomes
Given management cost reductions of some 40 per cent, clinical commissioning 
groups will have to be very selective about how they allocate their time and 
effort, such as between marginal and major service developments. The ‘labour’ of 
commissioning will have to be justified in relation to outcomes for local services 
and people, in part as measured by the clinical commissioning group’s performance 
against the new Clinical Commissioning Group Outcomes Indicator Set. The 
suggested ‘process’ measures of commissioning effectiveness set out in Table 3 may 
be helpful here.  
The Francis Inquiry Report’s assertion that commissioners should commission 
to improve the quality of care, and assure core and enhanced standards (Francis, 
2013), adds further weight to the need for commissioning labour to be directed 
towards the service areas that matter most. To do this, commissioners will need to 
consider carefully how they might use information from a range of sources (such as 
from commissioning support units and local peer reviews of clinical services) so that 
they can form a detailed and accurate picture of the quality of care given by local 
providers, and thus set priorities and specific goals for improvement.
Commissioners	have	to	know	when	to	stop	consulting	and	make	a	decision
Meetings and workshops often appeared in this research to be a ‘ritual’ (Peck and 
others, 2004), with the process of involvement of different people and interests 
almost being the core purpose, rather than the outcomes, namely task-related 
objectives with time limits. Clinical commissioners will need to be brave enough 
to ‘cut and run’ and make a decision when they feel they have undertaken enough 
consultation and engagement, even if this flies in the face of ingrained NHS  
(provider and commissioner) culture that favours extensive involvement and 
consultation as a way of reviewing and making changes to services. 
Clinical commissioners could arguably make a virtue of having less management 
resource at their disposal, using this to justify the development of clear 
guidelines about how they will go about local commissioning, and explaining 
the circumstances under which they will exert their right to halt (or shorten the 
overall extent of ) consultation, make a decision and move to procurement. The 
local practice of commissioning is rarely codified in the NHS (apart from the 
technical elements of procurement, the specification of contracts, and the setting of 
priorities for investment), but a greater degree of explicitness regarding the purpose 
and functions of local commissioning could serve to manage expectations among 
providers and others. 
Lessons could be gleaned from the experience of World Class Commissioning 
(Department of Health, 2007) where codifying the tasks of commissioning at a 
national level did lead primary care trusts to reflect on the range of their work, 
and to attend to neglected areas such as priority setting and public engagement 
(McCafferty and others, 2012). What was less helpful about World Class 
Commissioning was its use as a national assessment tool, leading to a focus on 
process at the expense of outcomes. The measures suggested in this research are 
intended as a developmental tool for local commissioners to use alongside the new 
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Clinical Commissioning Group Outcomes Indicator Set (formerly the Commissioning 
Outcomes Framework; NICE, 2013), rather than a suggested framework for national 
assessment of commissioning. 
Commissioning	is	a	tough	and	lonely	task	if	done	well
Skilled managers are critical to effective commissioning, these being individuals 
who can work productively with clinicians and others, persistently driving forward 
major areas of service development, and ensuring an appropriate balance between the 
relational and transactional elements of commissioning. These senior commissioners 
need to be largely separate from local provider interests, able to take a population 
health perspective, and have a degree of ‘clout’ conferred by holding budgets to fund 
services. Such commissioners need to be skilled as ‘boundary spanners’ (Williams, 
2002), yet will need significant support if they are not to become isolated and ‘burned 
out.’ Commissioning can be a lonely role, especially when it does the ‘tough work’ of 
transacting new or changed services that are likely at times to threaten professional and 
provider interests, or prove unpopular with some in the wider community.
Skilled managers are critical to effective commissioning... 
driving forward service development
Data	are	presented	as	problematic,	yet	are	the	key	to	the	solution
Commissioners in this research frequently called for better and more timely data about 
local needs, services, costs of provision, and patients’ and carers’ experience. There 
was a strong perception of such data being in existence and used for needs assessment 
and service specification, yet problematic to access and use in real-time for review and 
performance management with providers. 
A core role of clinical commissioning groups will continue to be to secure effective 
data about population health needs, requiring an effective relationship with public 
health colleagues in local government. This research points to the importance for 
clinical commissioners of ensuring that their in-house support, together with expertise 
from the commissioning support unit, is able to obtain and provide the timely data 
on service costs, activity and quality that they will need to make robust challenge of 
provider performance. 
The	role	of	providers	in	commissioning	needs	careful	thought	
This study underlined the importance of involving clinicians in local service 
development. Primary care trusts often identified a lead clinician to chair a programme 
of work, and reported that the value of this is securing legitimacy and expertise for the 
particular project. But engaging providers in the work of commissioning represents 
a blurring of the purchaser–provider roles, as with the use of a hospital consultant to 
lead a review of a service, or a GP to be chair of a clinical commissioning group. While 
there are clear benefits to this, in terms of clinicians driving change, there are also risks; 
including potential conflicts of interest, for example providers using senior clinicians to 
help ward off change being proposed by commissioners. 
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This issue is, however, more complicated for clinical commissioning groups, for they 
themselves are providers. From April 2013, groups of primary care providers will make 
commissioning decisions, working with acute, mental health and community health 
providers, as well as commissioning support units. The role of providers and other 
organisations in commissioning will need careful thought, as the complexity revealed in 
this research would seem to be set to grow. Where long-term conditions are concerned, 
however, it would be worth commissioners considering new approaches to the role of 
providers in making service changes (including payment and incentives), as we explore 
in the final section of this paper. 
There	is	a	need	for	clarity	about	the	outcomes	of	commissioning
In making assessments about the overall impact of each of the six service areas 
examined in depth in this research, the most striking finding was the lack of clarity 
about anticipated outcomes from commissioning activity, and hence the difficulty 
for primary care trusts (and researchers) to judge how far commissioning intentions 
had been realised. Just as there was a more limited focus on monitoring and review 
(compared with design, specification and engagement), so there was a relative lack 
of attention to addressing impact and outcomes. The new Clinical Commissioning 
Group Outcomes Indicator Set would appear to offer the possibility of a more robust 
framework for local clinical commissioning groups to establish and monitor desired 
outcomes from their ‘commissioning labour’, and this will need careful scrutiny by 
Health and Wellbeing Boards, and Healthwatch bodies, among others.
The most striking finding was the lack of clarity about 
anticipated outcomes from commissioning activity 
Implications for policy
The	purpose	of	commissioning	needs	to	be	clearly	articulated	
The English NHS has placed significant faith in commissioning to allocate scarce 
resources in a way that meets local need, and assures local people that services are of an 
appropriate level of quality. 
If commissioning is to prove its worth in the future more than the past (House of 
Commons Health Select Committee, 2011; Smith and Curry, 2011), it needs to 
have a clearly defined role and remit against which its progress can be measured. 
This role and remit need to be set out by the NHS Commissioning Board as overall 
steward of the new commissioning system, explaining both the purpose and the limits 
of commissioning as a function. As part of this, the role of clinical commissioning 
groups (and their GP members), and the NHS Commissioning Board itself, must be 
articulated to the public. A clear timetable for local public reporting of commissioning 
costs and outcomes will be required, addressing measures such as those suggested in 
Table 3.
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Commissioners	will	need	support	to	make	tough	decisions	
Clinical commissioning groups will not have the resource to collaborate with providers 
and other stakeholders as extensively as primary care trusts. 
They will need intelligence from commissioning support units to challenge providers 
on quality and value for money, where necessary, in contracts and procurement of 
services for their populations. The role of commissioners as convenors may have 
to adapt, or at the very least be scaled back. Commissioners will have to be highly 
selective about the priority areas for detailed review and specification in any one year, 
using benchmarking and other data to keep tabs on the performance of other services.
They will need high-quality public health and needs assessment advice, sophisticated 
and real-time data about services, accurate comparisons with national benchmarks, 
efficient payment and invoicing systems, and support for modelling and planning 
future care. In addition, they will need support in undertaking consultation and 
engagement activity, accessing and analysing patient and public experience data, 
providing local system leadership, and handling procurement within a cultural context 
of collaboration.
Commissioning	for	long-term	conditions	may	require	a	more		
sophisticated	approach
The apparent simplicity of commissioning as a two-sided transaction across the 
‘purchaser–provider split’ has been revealed by this research to be far from the reality 
of day-to-day NHS commissioning practice, at least where long-term conditions are 
concerned. Local commissioners are developing an alternative approach based on closer 
working between providers and commissioners. 
Services for those with long-term conditions are not easily ‘commodified’ within a 
purchaser–provider market. These services are provided over months and years, by 
a range of organisations and professionals, and it is hard to split them into single 
episodes. The traditional cycle of commissioning used in the NHS appears more  
suited to specific episodes of care, and to a situation where a funder can place a single 
contract with one or more providers. This research showed some of the tensions that 
can arise when an element of a wider service is ‘parcelled off’ for commissioning, as 
with diabetic podiatry in the Wirral, which was found to be caught between different 
contracts and providers.
International experience in planning and funding care for people with long-term 
conditions confirms the trend towards exploring different approaches to contracting 
for care. These include commissioning ‘chains of care’ in Sweden (Ahgren, 2003), using 
‘alliance contracts’ for integrated care in New Zealand (Stephenson, 2000), and the 
‘accountable care organisation’ as a way of sharing financial and service risk at primary 
care level in the USA (Fisher and others, 2007). Similar experiments are underway in 
the NHS in England, embracing the ambiguity of provider and commissioner roles 
in planning and developing local services. For example, the accountable lead provider 
model entails a provider being awarded a contract for a whole service or pathway of 
care across organisations (Corrigan and Laitner, 2012), and other outcomes-based 
approaches such as Capitated and Outcome-based Incentivised Contracts (COBIC; 
www.cobicsolutions.co.uk) are being trialled for mental health and other services. 
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What is common to these alternative approaches to contracting care for long-term 
conditions is a new way of sharing financial and service risk. The providers of care take 
on some or all of what would have been the commissioner’s risk; being responsible 
for assuring a set of services that will meet the needs of a particular local group of 
patients, such as the frail elderly, or vulnerable families. Thus learning and evidence 
about different approaches to payment reform need to be drawn into discussion about 
optimal ways of commissioning care. Critical to this is finding ways of ensuring that 
incentives for developing new approaches to care are located clearly with the providers 
whose practice will need to change.
The	regulation	of	commissioning	will	need	careful	consideration
In the reformed NHS, commissioning will take place within the regulatory framework 
determined by Monitor, the new health sector regulator. To date, regulation in 
the English NHS has been largely focused on providers, but from April 2013, the 
operation of the wider NHS market will be subject to regulation by Monitor, and 
this will include the behaviour of commissioners. Monitor is likely to have an interest 
in the way in which clinical commissioning groups procure services, their use of 
tendering, the operation of the ‘any qualified provider’ policy, and the existence of 
conflicts of interest on the part of those commissioning care.
The complex and nuanced nature of commissioning care for people with long-term 
conditions revealed by this research will thus present a particular challenge. New 
models of contracting, such as accountable lead provider or alliance contracting, 
are worth trying to see if they can offer patients an appropriate balance of choice 
of providers and integration of services. At the heart of this will be the crafting of 
arrangements that ensure that providers are incentivised to deliver care that is well 
coordinated and of high quality, while avoiding the risk of monopoly provision that 
compromises choice. 
Conclusion
NHS managers have evolved a labour-intensive and highly collaborative approach to 
commissioning care for long-term conditions that blurs the purchaser–provider split. 
This draws closely on the expertise and experience of providers. The effort expended on 
commissioning needs to be justified by the extent to which it results in better outcomes 
for patients.
From April 2013, the NHS enters a new phase and clinical commissioning groups 
will have to justify the way in which they commission care for people with long-term 
conditions. Clear goals, monitoring and review, with effective challenge of providers 
(backed up with data) is axiomatic. But so will be exploration of new forms of 
contracting and risk-sharing, to ensure that the effort of commissioning is worth the 
cost – a question we are still asking after two decades.
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